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Abstract
Experiments with family groups are rare, but since many decisions are taken
at the household level or occur within the household it is an important area
to investigate. I discuss some of the methodological challenges involved in
doing experiments with couples and families and consider major areas that
remain yet to be explored. While general themes from the research are still
emerging, there is little evidence of efficiency in intra-household decisions.
Moreover, deviations from standard models of microeconomics seem to be
in line with those seen in the anomalies literature of individual decision-
making.
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1. Introduction.
Though increasingly there are places such as the USA or Japan where
the single person household is the most common living arrangement, even
in such countries the majority of people live alongside other adults with
whom they make more or less shared decisions on a regular basis. Yet while,
experiments have become a familiar tool for the economist, used to test many
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of the fundamental models of the subject, there has been relatively little
attention paid to households.2 In fact, there are by now several thousand
economic experiments on individual decision-making and on games; and
until very recently there were few that examined the behaviour of collective
units like the household. Nevertheless, in the last ten years or so there has
been a trickle of experiments of couples, families and household units. This
uncertain flow of studies has reached the point where some common results
and issues are starting to emerge. As a consequence, it seems an appropriate
moment to offer a survey of the field.
Before continuing, it is useful to start out by identifying the reason why
we should consider experiments on families as somehow different. Household
or more specifically, couples are examples of groups and obviously there is
some tradition in both economics and psychology of doing experiments on
groups which has become more extensive recently (e.g. Cason and Mui
(1997) or Charness and Sutter (2012)). However, household groups are
endogenous (i.e. willingly formed) rather than exogenous, as is typically
the case with laboratory-born groups. They are also continuing groups,
which represents a challenge for inference since it implies that an experiment
represents the perturbation of a game with a history and a future, rather
than a stand-alone event. And within households, individuals are often
bound by deep feelings of duty, love and altruism which is not often the case
for the hastily assembled ad hoc groups of students that might be created
for laboratory experiments with teams. Typical group experiments therefore
may produce results that are quite different to those based on household
members.3
When we talk about experiments on households, we are really consider-
ing two different classes of tasks, although they may be combined within an
individual setting. In the first class, the focus is on the household as a col-
lective decision maker. There is one observation per task per household. For
instance, we might compare the behaviour in a beauty contest game between
individuals and couples. From this perspective, experiments with household
groups provide a way of testing whether the behaviour of natural groups and
individuals vary in a significant way in economic contexts. Secondly, exper-
iments can focus on responses from individual household members, usually
2Except where stated, I use the term ‘household’ and ‘family’ interchangeably, though
of course there are many family ties that extend beyond the household and there are
often members of the household who are not relatives. Additionally, I will treat the terms
spouse and partner as equivalent. In fact most experiments have been conducted with
couples (married or unmarried) and rarely with the whole household and so when papers
refer to households, it usually means the head of the household and his or her spouse. If
there were a bigger set of experiments with a variety of subsets of household and family
members it would be useful to be more exact.
3See Brandts and Sola` (2010) for an example of another experimental setting in which
personal relationships between participants affect behaviour.
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in the context of a game or at least a setting where subjects are made aware
of their household links. In both cases, experiments provide a means for
understanding intra-household decision-making, of testing between the nu-
merous theories of household behaviour (see Apps and Rees (2009) for a
survey) and providing the data for more refined models.
Of course within economics, theories of the household serve different pur-
poses. The predictive accuracy of the kinds of unitary models employed in
dynamic macroeconomic models for example may benefit little from a more
nuanced understanding of how households make individual decisions. And
with the consumption data available from national surveys on household
purchases it may not be possible to go beyonnd the identification of cooper-
ative models. However, in many policy settings a more detailed and accurate
model of intrahousehold behaviour could help the design and implementa-
tion of effective policies. For this reason alone, experiments on households
can be valuable.
2. Inference and validity.
Experiments with families create many of the same challenges as with the
typical subject groups and arguments over many issues are well-rehearsed
and probably not worth repeating here. But there are some specific method-
ological hurdles for household experiments and other factors that are am-
plified when households become the object of analysis all of which present
new challenges to experimental methodology. Most of these challenges arise
from the ongoing nature of the relationship between household members,
meaning that actions taken within the laboratory may be at least partially
offset by subsequent behaviour. This, I label the ‘undoing problem’.
2.1. The undoing problem.
Experiments on households typically alter the endowments and prices
faced by households rather than consumption directly (though this is in
theory possible). Typically the behaviour observed in experiments also rep-
resents interim acts rather than final consumption behaviour. Thus in order
to have tests of theories of household behaviour we need to make links be-
tween observed acts and theoretical predictions about consumption. To
frame the arguments here and in the rest of the paper I will use a simple
model of a two person household. Individual preferences of the two agents
are summarized by the utility functions, u and v respectively. Household
consumption in period t =0,...T, is xt which may be vector of goods, but
which I will usually think of as being a single good in each period. Period 0
is the period that includes the experiment. Each individual discounts future
rewards by ρi, i=1,2. The household when choosing collectively, decides ac-
cording to W, within which a weight of λ is attached to person 1’s interests
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and 1− λ is attached to the interest of person 2.
W =
t=T∑
t=0
(
λ
(
ρi
)t
u(xt) + (1− λ)
(
ρj
)t
v(xt)
)
(1)
Consider now a typical household experiment in which the participants
are a couple and an agent chooses between the options x and x′ where
x = (x1, x2) and x
′ = (x′1, x′2) and xi i = 1, 2 is the direct payoff to person i.
Here, I use the term ‘agent’ to encompass both choices made by individuals
and choice made jointly by the couple. After the choice is made, but prior
to actual consumption it is possible that compensatory transfers may be
carried out to undo or at least change the payments made in the experiment.
Reducing consumption of player 1 by 4 results in a transfer of t(4) to
player 2, where the function t is such that |4| ≥ |t(4)|. In particular
if costless transfers are possible then t (4) = 4, and if transfers are not
possible then t (4) = 0. The agent’s choice function weights the final payoffs4
of the two people by λ and (1 − λ) so x is chosen iff λ (x1 −4) + (1 −
λ) (x2 + t(4)) ≥ λ (x′1 −4′)+(1−λ) (x′2 + t(4′)) . Meanwhile the transfers
4 and4′ are optimally chosen according to the same choice function subject
to the constraints that x1 ≥ 4 ≥ −x2 and x′1 ≥ 4′ ≥ −x′2. In this situation
if x is chosen and t = 0 then,
λ ≥ x
′
2 − x2
x1 − x′1 + x′2 − x2
(2)
Thus the choice reveals something about the weight placed on the in-
dividual payoffs. On the other hand if t (4) = 4 then x is chosen when
x1 + x2 ≥ x′1 + x′2, in other words the agent chooses the highest aggre-
gate payoff and this reveals nothing about λ. Inference therefore depends
on knowing something about the t(.) function. The issue of ex-post un-
doing is not a problem unique to household experiments. In estimates of
inter-temporal discount rates may be biased when agents have access to
capital markets. Similarly, researchers investigating the endowment effect
have considered the possibility that estimates of value obtained by buy and
sell prices may be censored when there is easy access to the goods in local
shops.5 The particularly worry with households is that the cost of transfers
may be especially low.
When actions taken within the experiment are potentially reversible
through post-experimental intra-household transfers, there are a number of
ways to respond. One option is simply to take the actions in the experiment
4For simplicity I take it that utility is linear in payoffs for this initial case, but the
basic argument applies even if utility is non-linear.
5For example, in experiment 7 reported in Kahneman et al. (1990) the researchers
remind subjects of this possibility by leaving price tags on the mugs.
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at face value or to seek supporting evidence on behaviour by for instance,
conducting a post-experimental survey which asks subjects to report undo-
ing. A second possibility is to raise the cost of reversibility. For instance, if
subjects are paid in kind (e..g. through food or clothing coupons) transfers
may be made prohibitively costly. This may not eradicate the problem. A
coat or pair of trousers chosen now can be a close substitute for clothing
bought in one month’s time. Thus, spouses may compensate actions made
within the experiment with choices in the future.
For example, let us consider a small extension of the model, in which time
is divided into two periods: ‘now’ and the future. The future is weighted
by ρ ≥ 0, while income m for the future is allocated to individual i as mi.
In the actual experiment, as before, the agent chooses between x and x′and
the allocation of m is decided after the end of the ‘now’ period. There are
no transfers and the utility function is,
λx1 + (1− λ)x2 + ρ (λU(m1, x1) + (1− λ)V (m2, x2))
where U and V are the component functions for the two partners and
are taken to be increasing and differentiable in their components.
If in fact consumption is inter-temporally separable then the allocation
made in the future will be independent of the payoffs in the experiment. In
this situation, the experimental choices reveal something about λ. Consider
though the case where the utility function has the specific form,
λx1 + (1− λ)x2 + ρ (λU(m1 + x1) + (1− λ)V (m2 + x2))
This might arise if the goods in the experiment represent capital goods
with low depreciation rates such as clothing. In this case, x is chosen over
x′ only if,
λx1 + (1− λ)x2 + ρ (λU(m1 + x1) + (1− λ)V (m2 + x2)) ≥
λx′1 + (1− λ)x′2 + ρ
(
λU(m′1 + x
′
1) + (1− λ)V (m′2 + x′2)
)
(3)
Taking a first-order approximation for the utility functions to be exact
and noting that at an optimal allocation of future consumption, λU ′ =
(1− λ)V ′ then, equation 3 becomes,
λx1+(1−λ)x2+ρ
(
λ
(
U(m1) + x1U
′(m1)
)
+ (1− λ) (V (m2) + x2V ′ (m2)))
≥ λx′1 + (1− λ)x′2 + ρλ
(
U (m1) + U
′ (m1) (m′1 + x
′
1 −m1)
)
+ ρ (1− λ) (V (m2) + V ′ (m2) (m′2 + x′2 −m2)) (4)
or,
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ρλU ′(m1)
(
x1 + x2 − x′1 − x′2
) ≥ λ (x′1 − x1)+ (1− λ) (x′2 − x2) (5)
Thus, if the weight (ρU ′)placed on future rewards is sufficiently large
then the agent chooses x rather than x′ when the aggregate household payoff
is higher. As a result, in such circumstances the choice reveals nothing about
λ even though choices made in the experiment cannot be undone directly
through intra-household transfers.
Facing the possibility of undoing, a third option for the experimenter is
to mask or hide some aspect of the decision and or the winnings from the
spouse. For instance, the players might make a series of dictator game deci-
sions with different endowments. A low transfer to the partner can therefore
be due to a low endowment rather than meanness. As we shall see below,
masking the decision has been a common feature of household experiments.
It does not solve all problems however in part because we do not always
know the extent to which assets can be hidden outside of the experiment.
Secondly, asymmetric information does appear to be an important part of
many relationships (see Section 6), but it is not a universal feature and
in many experiments we may actually wish to understand behaviour when
decisions are transparent.
A fourth option is to make full undoing impossible, by offering decisions
that change the feasible consumption set for the household. Risky decisions
that are resolved within the experiment have this property, but also some
other games. For instance, in a modified dictator game, the spouse may
have to choose between a pair of payments (50, 50) or (80, 0). The second
choice cannot be transformed into the first choice through costless transfers
outside of the experiment. However, the first option can be transformed into
the second choice (as long as there is free disposal). So choosing the first
option cannot reveal anything about λ unless there is some information on
t(.) but choosing the second option shows that λ ≥ 5/8 and t(30) ≥ 20.
Although one might not trust the potentially reversible behaviour ob-
served in an experiment to the same degree as that attached to irreversible
acts, nevertheless it may be unwise to dismiss it entirely. It is clear though
that when acts are reversible, no firm inferences can be made about house-
hold theories in the absence of further identifying assumptions.
2.2. Theory testing.
A prime motive for experiments in economics is the testing of formal the-
ories. Household economics has generated a number of well-known models,
including unitary, Pareto efficient and non-cooperative. When applied to a
particular household, how should such a theoretical model be interpreted?
Is it for instance, a summary of a binding commitment that applies to all
family members in all circumstances or does it represent an equilibrium out-
come that in the event of a disruption to the normal environment (e.g. an
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experiment) should not be expected to apply? How should a static model for
instance be sensibly tested, when the household context is clearly dynamic?
Such debates about context and appropriate domain are also relevant for
individual choice - witness the continuing debate over the implications of
the calibration theorem in Rabin (2000) or the extended discussion about
theory testing in Bardsley et al. (2009) - but while some conventions and
practices have become familiar and standardized in individual choice exper-
iments, the rules are not yet agreed for household-based tests. A particular
issue with household experiments is how to interpret decisions made indi-
vidually by a partner. One (possibly extreme) interpretation of household
models is that they generate predictions for all choice situations faced by
household members. As a consequence, individual and joint choice should
match and measures of individual power will not therefore be identifiable.
In fact, as we shall see below, individual and joint choices do often differ, so
this perspective is not maintainable in the face of the evidence. How then
should individual choice be interpreted when it is made by spouses or other
linked members of a household?
2.3. Incentive compatibility.
We have some straightforward results for when choices made in experi-
ments are incentive compatible. When individuals are part of a larger group
and other members of the group are also making decisions, then what con-
stitutes a good incentive is no longer so clear. In some experiments all
subjects are paid once for an individual choice and once for a subsequent
choice made jointly with a partner. It is fairly clear that this gives rise to
a number of distortionary incentives, but the nature of the distortion will
depend on the appropriate model of family decision-making and whether
individuals are altruistic or not. In a unitary household, for instance, the
three payments (once to each spouse and once for the household) will simply
be an opportunity for risk reduction across tasks.
2.4. Scrutiny.
A recurring issue in the discussion of external validity is the extent to
which subjects’ behaviour within the lab is the result of being placed un-
der scrutiny by researchers. In Levitt and List (2007) organising model,
experimental subjects place weight on their monetary payoffs and on be-
ing moral. When scrutiny of their actions is higher they are more likely to
behave morally. Similarly when stakes are relatively low, a greater weight
may be placed on moral acts. If we take this model and apply it specifi-
cally to the issue of reversible acts, then it has three predictions. First acts
which are moral will receive greater weight in a laboratory setting than in
real contexts. Secondly, differences in behaviour between groups (e.g. men
versus women) with equal scrutiny may either be the result of differences in
underlying preferences or due to differences in the response to scrutiny.
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A feature of experiments with couples and other household members is
that in almost all cases to date, the couples are aware that they are the focus
of the experiment. This heightens the scrutiny effect, but it also means that
subjects are aware of two audiences: the experimenters and their spouses
or other household members. From the viewpoint of external validity, the
importance of scrutiny by partners is hard to judge. Individuals within
relationships are usually aware that choices they make will have an impact
on their partners and that some choices at least have symbolic value. If
a spouse, say, chooses an equal distribution of payoffs in an experimental
task rather than an unequal split with a higher aggregate payoff, this might
be out of a desire to impress their partner. But if this is how she or he
actually makes choices within the relationship then scrutiny is actually an
aid to external validity rather than a hindrance. To identify how the kind
of scrutiny has an impact on decisions one would like to have a design that
manipulates the ability of one of the observers to deduce the choices on the
basis of observing the winnings.
2.5. Selection.
The subjects who take part in laboratory experiments are not usually
typical of the population at large (Henrich et al. (2010)) for a variety of
reasons. With couples in particular we need to be aware of two other fac-
tors that can affect participation. The first is the high opportunity cost
of time for getting the joint attention of parents, particularly those from
nuclear families with young children. The second is that we might expect
that samples will be biased in favour of couples with relatively healthy and
stable relationships and who are more comfortable being the focus of an
experiment. Researchers have dealt with the first issue in a number of ways:
by arranging childcare (Bateman and Munro (2005)), by visiting families in
their own homes (e.g. Carlsson et al. (2012), Abdellaoui et al. (2013)), by
buying toys and arranging settings where accompanying children can play
close to their parents (Munro et al. (2008b)) or by involving children in the
experiment (Peters et al. (2004) but though the second issue has been ac-
knowledged by researchers it remains to be seen whether it is an important
factor in external validity.
2.6. Ethics.
Experiments are by definition disruptive and in the case of families,
experimental interventions may bring to the surface hidden difficulties in
the household. Moreover, there are reports of cases in which well-meant
social interventions into family life have led to increased violence between
partners (see Rahman (1999) for a discussion of the impact of micro-credit
initiatives on marital violence in Bangladesh - though Bajracharya and Amin
(2013) for example suggest that selection effects may be responsible for
some of the measured associations). While allowing players to hide their
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winnings may avoid issues of blame and attributions of selfishness and so on,
it may not: the insecure spouse may just seek to unearth hidden information
through bullying and threats. A further aspect of experiments on couples
is that if a public venue is used they may bring married men and women
into close proximity with non-family members of the opposite sex. In some
cultures that is considered inappropriate. It may also produce selection and
compliance problems for the researchers. One way to avoid the problem is
to conduct experiments in the home, but this may raise issues of privacy in
the experiment. Another approach would be to separate spouses before the
experiment and match the gender of the researchers and the participants.
While this may avoid some cultural problems it can produce issues with the
identification of experimenter effects. Perhaps the greatest challenge is that
many fundamental policy issues are ethically fraught. How do we reduce
marital violence? What are the factors behind child neglect? From the
viewpoint of generating data for effective policy, experimental interventions
could be extremely valuable, but this is not an area to treat lightly.
3. Efficiency.
Household decisions are Pareto efficient if option A is chosen over B,
whenever all members of the household weakly prefer A to B and at least
one person strictly prefers A. Often in discussion of household efficiency, the
Kaldor-Hicks variety is more relevant: those who prefer A over B could in
principle compensate those who prefer B over A such that no-one in the
household is worse off with A rather than B. Much of the non-experimental
evidence on household efficiency concerns the Kaldor-Hicks kind and much
of it comes from surveys of West African farm households, in which husbands
and wives pursue separate economic activities and apparently fail to take
jointly beneficial resource allocation decisions (Akresh (2008); Udry (1996))
or fail to insure each other completely (Duflo and Udry (2004)). However a
limitation of most evidence based on naturally occurring data is that it may
suffer from omitted variables bias, which is exceedingly difficult to avoid
however carefully soil characteristics, land management and other potential
confounds are controlled for. For example, the often cited study by Udry
(1996) for Burkina Faso did not control for fallow duration, which is very
important in the farming systems in much of West Africa and whose omis-
sion in the analysis could drive the reported result of apparent inefficiency
(c.f. Goldstein and Udry (2008)). Indeed, in a natural field experiment
in Mexico in which confounding factors were ruled out because women’s
income was varied randomly as part of an evaluation of the PROGRESA
programme, the evidence favours the interpretation that husbands and wives
are efficient in their resource allocation decisions (Bobonis (2009)). A fur-
ther issue is that the data available for consumption and expenditure may
be too noisy or sporadic to reveal whether households are efficient. Using
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a Monte-Carlo analysis, Agu¨ero (2008) for instance clearly shows that the
data typically used to estimate household models may struggle to identify
the correct theory.
Peters et al. (2004) represents the first clear economics experiment us-
ing household groups and is designed primarily as a test of Becker’s rotten
kid theorem (Becker (1974); Bergstrom (1989)). In that model of a unitary
household with full information, the child is induced to behave according to
the preferences of the household by the possibility of compensating transfers
by the household decision maker. Assuming that preferences are positively
monotonic, in a linear voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) played
by household members, the child should avoid free-riding - to do so would
lower total household income and thereby lower reward to the child after
subsequent transfers. In the experiment 135 family members (plus 20 uni-
versity students) were recruited from a university summer programme in
the USA and local primary schools. Subjects played 3 and 4 person VCM
games (according to the size of the family group) either within the family
(labelled ’F’) or in groups of strangers that had the same adult/child com-
bination (labelled ‘S’). In the two main treatments, F-S-F and S-F-S, each
group played the game 8 times then switched to the other group compo-
sition before switching back after another 8 games for a final group of 8
games played with the original set of players. Other treatments include one
where the strangers group was homogeneous with respect to maturity, one
where cheap talk was possible between adults and children and one compar-
ison treatment where students played the same game with the same set of
instructions in groups of 4. A theme that runs through the results is that
parents contribute more to the public good compared to their children. In
general players give more to the public good when the game is played within
the family than with strangers, but 100% contribution to the family public
good was not the median behaviour. There appears to be some differences
between the F-S-F and S-F-S treatments in that behaviour in subsequent
parts of the experiment was anchored on behaviour in the first part. As a
result, in S-F-S, subjects in the family section of the experiment contributed
less than in the F-S-F treatment and showed the same downward trend in
contributions typical of finitely repeated play in VCM experiments. Con-
versely, in the F-S-F treatment, contributions showed no downward trend
in the strangers section of the experiment. Many adults who contributed
all in the family game also contributed everything in the game played with
strangers. According to Peters et al. (2004) this may have been partly due
to the desire to ‘teach’ children, but also because many of the adults were
familiar with one another from the campus programme. In debriefing with
participants it appears that children understood the in-game consequences
of free-riding, but did not make the link between how they played the game
and what adults would do after the game.
In Cochard et al. (2014) 100 French couples play a Prisoners’ dilemma
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(PD) with their spouses followed by a PD played against a stranger of the
opposite sex. Some 2/5 of the participants then replay their spouses and
finally all the players take place in a distribution experiment which is sep-
arately incentivized. The main result is that levels of cooperation within a
couple are not absolute, although the observed defection rate (27%) is sig-
nificantly lower than that observed in the strangers’ game (57%). When the
game with spouses is repeated, defection falls to 14%, suggesting that fur-
ther repetition might lead to mean outcomes approximating the cooperative
solution. The first-period result is obviously incompatible with a universal
model of household cooperation, but also (ignoring opportunities for ex post
redistribution) with simple non-cooperative models where the spouse puts
a relative weight, of less than 13/22 on the partner’s payoffs.
Iversen et al. (2010) conduct an experiment with 240 couples using vari-
ants of a simple two person VCM in which the endowment of each partner
is a secret. The location is Bufumbo sub-county and Sironko District on the
slopes of Mt Elgon in south eastern Uganda, a densely settled rural area.
Livelihoods in the area are predominantly agricultural, but still complex and
diverse and with both joint and individual enterprises pursued by household
members. In the games, each person decides how much to contribute to a
common household pool which is then increased by 50%. The rules for the
allocation of the common pool and the degree of asymmetric information
vary by treatment. In some treatments for instance, the pool is simply split
equally, while in other cases one spouse has control and even in some treat-
ments one spouse controls the initial endowment while the other determines
the allocation. Despite the fact that endowments represent 2-3 average daily
wages in the area and there is a 50% premium for making public contribu-
tions to the pool, the majority of individuals keep back some money from
the common account.
This paper is followed by a series of larger studies in three other coun-
tries conducted by a linked group of authors. Kebede et al. (2014) uses a
similar VCM game to examine efficiency in three regions of Ethiopia with
a total of 1,200 married couples. Poor sections of Addis Ababa, the capital
city, formed the urban site, while the two rural communities were located in
the north-east and south-west respectively. In each site, five locations were
selected, either distinct villages or separate urban locations. The experi-
ments in each area were done in five consecutive days, going to one site in
one day and playing different treatments in the mornings and afternoons to
avoid contamination. In the northern site centralised control of agricultural
decisions by the male household head is the most common arrangement,
whereas in the southern site, populated mainly by a minority ethnic group,
the Hadiya, women have stronger involvement in the management of the
staple crop. In all three locations both men and women rarely place all
their investment into the common pool. The authors try a number of varia-
tions on the basic game, including full information, assigning control of the
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Table 1: Efficiency tests.
Study Location,
sample
Method Notable Results
Peters et al.
(2004)
USA, 135
individuals
Family and strangers 4 person
VCM
Parents contribute more than
children, 100% efficiency is not
median for family game
Bateman and
Munro
(2005)
Norwich, UK,
40
separate and joint choices
between lotteries
Many joint choices reject Pareto
efficiency
Chao and
Kohler
(2007)
Malawi, 240
subjects
modified dictator and trust
games played within couples and
with strangers
Efficiency slightly higher within
couples, but still less than half
endowment is given to spouse in
trust game.
Iversen et al.
(2010)
Uganda, 240 Intra-couple VCM Modal contribution of 100% but
most individuals keep back some
money.
Munro et al.
(2010)
Nigeria, 80
households
Intra-family VCM; half the
sample are from 2 wife
polygynous households
Median contribution is 50%;
efficiency the same in polygyny
Takashima
(2011)
Mongolia, 178 Joint and separate choices Efficiency is rejected
Couprie et al.
(2012)
France (87) ,
Germany (69)
Choice between equal and
efficient in modified dictator
games
Majority of individuals favour
equality over efficiency
Robinson
(2012)
Kenya, 142 Consumption depends on who
receives the income; full
insurance is rare.
Consumption depends on who
receives the income; full insurance
is rare.
Schro¨der
et al. (2013)
Germany, 58 Labour supply experiment; joint
and individual tax treatments
Effort does not vary with tax
treatment
Munro et al.
(2014)
India, 1200 Intra-couple VCM, trust and
modified dictator games
Median contribution is 50-75%.
Few contribute 100%
Kebede et al.
(2014)
Ethiopia, 1200 Intra-couple VCM, trust and
modified dictator games
Most contribute less than 100%.
Cochard
et al. (2014)
Toulouse,
France, 100
Prisoner’s dilemma played with
partner and with strangers
Defection within couples is not
zero, but 30% lower than within
stranger pairs.
Castilla
(2014)
India,
Uttarakhand,
185
Trust game between spouses Mean amount transferred is 57%.
Lopez et al.
(2015)
Colombia,
Japan, 170
subjects
Simultaneous sepeated
intra-couple and stranger VCM
Household efficiency close to 100%
when single pool used for
contributions
Couprie et al.
(2015)
France, 81 Allocation of time to stereotyped
(e.g. folding socks) and neutral
production tasks
Doing stereotyped tasks reduces
the probability of efficient division
of labour.
Note: for sample size I report the number of couples in the experiment except where explicitly stated
otherwise. Papers are listed in order of date, but this does not always indicate priority as I use the journal
publication date where possible and some papers have a lengthy prior history of circulation as working
papers.
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allocation to one partner and making subjects work for their endowments
using a simple matchbox assembly task. Although efficiency varies some-
what between treatments, in none of them does the level of contribution to
the common pool rise above 75%.
Similar results are reported for three locations of India by Munro et al.
(2014), picked to exemplify the key differences in household structure be-
tween north and south India identified by anthropologists. Across all treat-
ments most subjects kept back at least part of their endowment from the
common pool and mean contributions across most locations and treatments
were in the 50-70% range. Contributions were lowest in the southern state
of Tamil Nadu, for both men and women and highest in the urban location,
Varanesi. Castilla (2014) plays trust games between spouses in Uttarakand,
a state in northern India that used to be part of Uttar Pradesh. She finds
that spouses send on 57% of their endowments on average to their part-
ners, in line with the previous results for Uttar Pradesh in Munro et al.
(2014) despite the fact that in her experiment the multiple for transferred is
significantly higher. Approximately 54% of the amount is then transferred
back.
A third study Munro et al. (2010) extends the experimental method
used for couples in other countries to a group of polygynous households in a
Muslim area of northern Nigeria. There is no evidence that cooperation (as
evidenced by investment in the common pool) is higher in the three adult
games, compared to the monogamous couples. However, in a treatment
where husbands are allowed to control the allocation from the common pool,
second wives in polygyny receive lower payouts compared to the first wives,
with husbands taking the largest share. As with the other countries in
the programme, in treatments involving couples efficiency levels were well
below 100%, with women in particular contributing less than 50% of their
endowments to the common pool.
Robinson (2012) also looks at the risk-sharing aspect of household decision-
making, a different dimension of efficiency, using an experimental design
which unfolds over several weeks as spouses are randomly chosen to receive
small rewards. In the collective model household, shocks received by the
husband should have the same consequences for the ratio of marginal util-
ities of the spouses as same sized shocks received by the wife. Marginal
utilities and marginal rates of substitution are typically not observable for
household goods, so in the experiment Robinson uses survey methods to
track consumption on private goods between April and October 2006 and
assumes a functional form for the utility functions which implies that the
source of the shock should not matter for its impact on consumption. With
this kind of experiment, internal validity of the results relies on the accuracy
of subject’s recall and the careful enumeration of post-intervention expendi-
ture. If the error in measuring consumption is correlated with the receipt of
winnings, then the estimates of the impact of the treatment will be biased.
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In this study the sample is 142 couples, taken from a group of daily income
earners in three towns in Western and Nyanza Provinces, Kenya. The men
are bicycle taxi drivers, while the women typically have no market income
or sell produce and other items in the marketplace. Using daily income
workers is attractive for this investigation precisely because they are used
to dealing with randomness in earnings. In the experiment each of the sub-
jects faces a 50% chance of a weekly income boost of 150 Kenyan shillings,
which is about 100% or 20% of female and male weekly income respectively.
The individual lotteries are public within the household, and independent,
meaning that there is an equal chance that no-one receives the win and that
both win. Robinson (2012) rejects efficient sharing, finding through separate
interviews with male and female spouses that expenditure on private con-
sumption does not change after women receive a shock whereas when men
receive extra income 17% of it goes on their private consumption expendi-
ture. With both sexes, most of the windfall is actually saved and Robinson
(2012) cannot reject a permanent income hypothesis.
A different approach is pursued in Couprie et al. (2012) which com-
pares measures of aversion to intra-household inequality amongst French
and German couples. Eighty-seven couples were recruited through adverts
in Germany (Mannheim) and 69 couples in France (Toulouse). Individually
and without consultation subjects face modified dictator games in which, for
each task, he or she must choose between one allocation that is equal and
one that favours one partner but is more efficient in the Kaldor-Hicks sense.
In the some of the tasks it is the chooser who receives the higher amount
while in others it is the spouse. One task per couple is selected randomly at
the end of the experiment. The difference between the sexes is small, though
more men tend to pick the efficient option. The clearest result though is
the sharp difference between the countries: approximately 74% of couples
in France are classified by the experimenters as ‘income maximizers’, mean-
ing that they were always Kaldor-Hicks efficient. In Germany only 39% of
individuals fall into the same category. The second largest category in both
countries is what they authors term ‘inequality averse symmetric’ mean-
ing that the subjects pick the equal shares outcome when the alternative
is highly unequal, but do not favour themselves or their partners in their
choices. This group represents 17% of French women and 13% of French
men, compared to 39.1% of German women in the sample and 25.3% of
their spouses. The large gap between male and female responses for Ger-
many is mirrored in another category of inequality averse subjects wherein
the choosers are asymmetric in their choices and favour their own payoffs.
Approximately 40% of the difference between countries in the behaviour
can be attributed to differences in sample composition, with for instance,
younger and agents with more education are more likely to favour equality.
But the remaining differences between countries remains unexplained by the
covariates available to the researchers. It is not clear how to interpret the
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results of this kind of experiment. We are used to thinking of the experi-
menter as the audience, but as I noted in Section 2.4 in an experiment of this
kind, the subjects actually have two observers: the experimenter and the
spouse. When the subjects make symbolic choices of equality over income
maximization as a signal to spouses, then this may be a good reflection of
how they behave within the home. In this experiment, if a subject receives
Euro 10 at the end of the experiment, then she or he knows the choice made
by their partner. And since the questions faced by partners were the same,
then one individual can deduce what choice was made by the other individ-
ual when she or he receives the prize. A more recent experiment by Couprie
et al. (2015) faces 81 French couples with production tasks, some of which
are neutral (e.g. stuffing envelopes) and some of which are typically gen-
dered (e.g. folding socks ). They find that in gendered tasks, allocation of
partners to the tasks is less efficient when the tasks are gender stereotyped.
According to the authors, the effect seems to be driven by prior beliefs about
the relative efficiency of the sexes in different tasks.
For modified dictator games played within households in rural Malawi,
Chao and Kohler (2007) recruit 240 subjects from 60 households. In each
case the four person group consisted of a wife, her husband and his parents -
reflecting the patrilineal nature of the region. Each session consisted of one
family group from one village and two family groups from another village,
with groups separated into two different rooms by village. Subjects played
face-to-face triple dictator and trust games with others in the same room
and played the same games with the strangers from the other room without
coming face-to-face. In a triple dictator game, any amount transferred to
the other player is multiplied by three. According to efficiency models of the
household, subjects should allocate all their endowments to their partners
in both the trust and triple dictator games. For other interactions the pre-
dictions are less clear cut, but standard stories about altruism suggest that
individuals will give less to their partners the greater the social distance.
The results indicate that subjects were only weakly influenced by social dis-
tance. Spouses, for instance were allocated 39.9% of the endowment in the
triple dictator game, while strangers got 32.6 with relatives and acquain-
tances somewhere in-between. In case of the trust game, individuals entrust
slightly more to their relatives than they do to non-relatives (approximately
45% compared to 41%), but the difference is not significant. Moreover, in-
dividuals seem to entrust the same amount on average to spouses as they
do to parents or adult children. According to bivariate and linear regres-
sion tests, health and HIV status do not seem to be significant factors in
the experimental behaviour, but the amount passed to the partner in the
triple dictator game is related to beliefs about relative wealth as well as
age and relative ages. One issue in an experiment of this type, is whether
the close presence in the experiment of neighbours and relatives might limit
individual’s ability to discriminate according to social distance, but that
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would still not explain why the amounts passed to strangers in the other
room were only slightly smaller than the amounts passed to spouses.6 Since
the amount passed to spouses is typically well short of 100% in both types
of games, overall therefore the evidence is strongly against intra-household
efficiency.
In Germany, Schro¨der et al. (2013) conduct a tax and labour supply
experiment with 58 couples who engage in piece-work under different tax
and compensation schemes. They find that the tax system (individual or
joint) does not affect effort in the experiment. In Mongolia, Takashima
(2011) with a sample of 174 couples in Ulan Bator also rejects efficiency
and income pooling using a set of lotteries wherein household risk is always
zero and one lottery dominates the other at the household level. Using an
accompanying survey of household decision-making she finds that efficiency
is rejected even for the sub-sample of couples who report that all income is
shared. One instance where household efficiency is nearly achieved appears
to be in the recent experiment by Lopez et al. (2015) where couples from
Japan and later Colombia play repeated VCM games with their partners.
Repetition itself seems to have little effect on contribution rates, which may
allay some of the worries over the results from one-shot games. However, in
both countries subjects simultaneously play a VCM against a stranger in the
same venue. In one treatment there are separate pools for the two games,
but in the other treatment subjects make contributions to the household
and stranger games from a single pool. In this game, household efficiency
achieves close to 100% in both locations. In fact total efficiency rises in
the treatment with a single pool, as subjects keep back less from the public
goods, compared to the treatment where there are separate pools. This
is a single result, but it suggests that household efficiency may arise when
spouses are in a situation where ‘us and them’ is highly salient.
4. Bargaining and Power.
Faced with a decision individually, one spouse chooses option A from
the set A,B. Meanwhile the other spouse chooses B. Asked to make a
joint decision from the same set of options the couple choose A, suggesting
that it is the first spouse who holds more power. As I noted above, this
interpretation may not be correct for a number of reasons, including the
possibility of later transfers between spouses, altruism and mispredictions
of the partner’s preferences.
6Eckel et al. (2006) in a similar experiment conducted in Mexico also report a small
difference between the amounts passed to fellow villagers and to strangers from other
villages. However, the amounts passed between spouses is significantly higher. In Holden
and Bezu (2013) there is a quite a large difference between the way individuals treat
spouses and non-spouses in a dictator game in Ethiopia.
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Within social psychology and marketing, ample hypothetical experi-
ments on intra-household power can be found (e.g. Williams and Chen
(2013)), much of traceable back to the influential work of Davis (1976).
Within this literature, recognisably economic concepts of bargaining and
power are prominent, but much of the focus is on the process of decision-
making or on the perspectives and motives of the individuals involved.
In this tradition, the widely cited Corfman and Lehmann (1987) rep-
resent an early approach that has some clear parallels to methods used in
economic experiments, but still differs in important ways most notably in
the absence of monetary incentives. In the original paper, Corfman and
Lehmann (1987) recruit a sample of US couples. Both partners are first
presented separately with a series of 54 hypothetical dichotomous decisions
and asked to make a choice. From their answers the researchers selected a
subset of decisions over which the partners differed. This set, which would
differ between households, was then shown to the couples who were asked
to come to a joint resolution of the conflict. Corfman and Lehmann (1987)
found a small but significant (p < 0.05) tendency for partners who ‘won’
on one question to have a lower probability of winning a subsequent dis-
puted question. The hypothetical nature of the choices make the incentives
unclear in this experiment. Moreover if the subjects do take the questions
seriously, there is may be some advantage to being strategic in the first
stage in order to influence the set of questions faced jointly. Similar ap-
proaches can be found in a number of marketing studies, including Curry
et al. (1991) who consider power in a series of hypothetical household de-
cisions. Later work by Munro et al. (2008b) with real incentives also finds
that couples resolve disputed allocations through a process of turn taking.
Using a sample of established couples, they conduct an experiment on house-
hold decision-making. Individual partners first make a series of dichotomous
choices between household goods and vouchers for experiences (e.g. karting
or a visit to a London theatre) and then the couple jointly face the same
choices. A random lottery device is used to incentivize the decisions. They
find clear evidence of turn-taking as a method of resolving disagreements.
In other words, when one partner wins one disputed question, it raises the
probability that the other partner wins the next dispute.
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Table 2: Bargaining.
Study Location,
sample size
Method Notable Results
Corfman and
Lehmann (1987)
Canada Hypothetical individual and
collective choices
Some alternation of winning a dispute
Dosman and
Adamowicz
(2006)
Canada, 543 Hypothetical and actual campsite
choices
Majority of collective decisions reflect
woman’s preferences
Munro et al.
(2008b)
UK, 50 Real dichotomous decisions over
non-monetary prizes made
individually then jointly
Evidence of turn-taking in the winning
of disupted decisions.
Lindhjem and
Navrud (2009)
Norway, 473 Hypothetical choices on
biodiversity preservation
Answers are similar whether subjects
are asked as individuals or on behalf of
the family
Beharry-Borg
et al. (2009)
Trinidad, 45
tourist couples
Hypothetical choice experiment on
water quality
No clear pattern of individual influence
in joint decisions
Bateman and
Munro (2009)
Norwich, UK,
120 couples
Hypothetical choice experiment on
food qualities
No support for representative agent
model.
Miller and
Mobarak (2011)
Bangladesh,
2228 households
Decisions on improved cooking
stoves
Men’s decisions dominate final choices.
De Palma et al.
(2011)
Jena Germany,
22
Risk decisions Mouse-holder has more say in joint
choices.
Marcucci et al.
(2011)
Italian families,
78
Hypothetical location decisions No support for representative agent
model but best predictors of household
choices are generally wives’ choices.
Scarpa et al.
(2012)
Northern Italy,
266
Hypothetical choice experiment on
tap water quality
Only small differences in male and
female preference once scale is allowed
to vary by gender
Wiig et al.
(2012)
rural Peru, 255
couples
Games played separately and
jointly
Inherited land predicts influence in joint
play.
Beblo and
Beninger (2012)
Mannheim,
Germany, 95
Choice of department store
vouchers after experimental
winnings paid
Where preferences differed, 50% of
couples were income poolers and 50%
were not.
Holden and
Bezu (2013)
Southern
Ethiopia, 380
Dictator games with partners and
non-family villagers
Equal sharing with spouses in about
65% of cases. Wives (husbands)
allocated zero to spouses in 23% (15%)
cases .
Carlsson et al.
(2013)
China, Guizhou
province, 117
couples
Comparing individual and jointly
made risky choices
Choices most similar to those made by
husband. Women have more weight if
they earn more or are party members.
Braaten and
Martinsson
(2015)
Andean Peru,
287
Comparing individual and jointly
made risky choices
Choices more similar to husbands’
Dasgupta and
Mani (2015)
India, Delhi, 105 Choices between private and
household good voucher. Earned
versus unearned endowment
Men more likely to choose individual
voucher after effort task. Women
unaffected by treatment
Note: the list of experiments with hypothetical choices is not comprehensive.
Dosman and Adamowicz (2006) consider a mix of actual camping choices
and hypothetical choices made by 543 Canadian couples and use individual
and collective choice data to measure influence. They conclude that, “In
fact, the majority of the households’ preference structures more closely re-
flect the women’s preferences than the men’s. For approximately 5% of the
households this decision seems to be a compromise between both partners
because their holiday choices do not clearly reflect either the male’s or the
female’s preferences.” Similar exercises have been conducted for a number of
non-market choice experiments though without the accompanying revealed
preference data that Dosman and Adamowicz (2006) use. For instance,
Marcucci et al. (2011) look at power in residential decisions in a hypothet-
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ical experiment played with family members in Italian cities. Meanwhile,
Beharry-Borg et al. (2009) examine preferences for beach and water qual-
ity amongst 90 visitors to tourist resorts in Trinidad and Tobago. As with
earlier studies individual expressions of preference are compared to jointly
expressed attitudes to see which member of the partnership held views clos-
est to the joint view. Beharry-Borg et al. (2009) do not find a clear pattern.
One reason for the lack of a clear pattern of revealed power is that some indi-
viduals may answer the individual questions purely from a personal point of
view, whereas other participants may anticipate the views of other people in
the household and try to speak for the household. In the research by Lind-
hjem and Navrud (2009) on preserving biodiversity in Norwegian forests, the
researchers compare the responses when 473 individuals are asked to speak
as individuals to the values expressed when respondents are asked to speak
on behalf of the household. In a split sample test, they find no significant dif-
ference in the figures from the two perspectives, but in a within sample test
(i.e. when subjects are asked to give responses from more than one perspec-
tive), they find significantly higher willingness to pay from the household
perspective. Bateman and Munro (2009) meanwhile compare individual and
joint perspectives on willingness to pay for improved food quality or safety
amongst 120 couples in a UK city. While they find that couples frequently
differ in their responses, they do not find that one gender has more power;
nor do they find evidence that expertise - in the form of the day-to-day food
purchaser - is a good predictor of who has more influence in joint choices. Of
course if individuals within the household have identical preferences, then
issues of power become irrelevant from the viewpoint of predicting choices.
Scarpa et al. (2012) analyse data on attitudes to tap water quality and argue
that, if differences in scale are allowed for in the estimation procedure then
there is only a small difference in the preferences of the sexes in their sam-
ple. Hensher et al. (2011) gather data on the dimensions of car preferences
from 244 respondents from Sydney, Australia and come to the same view:
preferences within the group do not differ substantially. Using a computer
interface to present the options, individuals face 8 hypothetical questions
about cars with different attributes, while dyads see four questions of the
same type. In the latter case, both partners must express preferences, on
the same screen and this joint and public entry, though possibly a realistic
feature of actual choices may drive the high level of congruence between
the answers received from the partners. Whatever the cause of the corre-
lation, the researchers are unable to estimate a reliable model of individual
influence in the joint decisions. Comparing jointly-made and individually
answered questions, they find a significant difference once heterogeneity in
scale is allowed for and like the earlier work by Bateman and Munro (2009)
conclude that group decisions were different to those made by a represen-
tative household-decision maker. The issue of scale raised by Hensher et al.
(2011) points to a important feature of econometric as opposed to theoretical
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models of choice. In the typical random utility model of individual choice,
the value of of x to the individual is, u(x) + ε where ε is a random variable
with mean 0 and variance, σ2ε . Random utility for the partner is v(x) + η
where η has mean 0 and variance σ2η. How should we think of jointly made
choices in this context? One simple option is to suppose that household
utility is simply a weighted sum of individual random utility. This gives us,
W = λ (u(x) + ε) + (1− λ) (v(x) + η) (6)
Consider for an example a household where person 1 always prefers x
to y and has certain preferences, so that σ2ε = 0. Meanwhile for person 2
v(x) < v(y) but the random element means that in a fraction p of occasions
the expressed individual preference is x preferred to y. Now, actuallyλ = 0,
meaning that person 1 has no power. Over a large number of repetitions,
we observe that individually person 2 chooses y over x on a fraction (1− p)
occasions. In joint decisions, x is chosen in a fraction p of decisions where
individuals have expressed different opinions. Erroneously, it appears that
person 1 has power. Indeed the more randomness there is in person 2’s
decisions, the more power person 1 appears to hold. Identification of λ from
joint and individual choices is therefore by assumption on the scale parame-
ters for individual and joint choice. In addition, there is the possibility that
the error term for household choices is correlated with that for individual
decisions. A further issue, discussed in Scarpa et al. (2012)’s paper on tap
water preferences, is that is some cases the stated choices of the couple are
more extreme than those of the individual components. This suggests that a
‘weighted average’ model of household random utility is not always correct:
households, just like other groups, might make decisions in an interactive
manner that does not reflect individual preferences.7 As such interpreting
estimates for λ as measures of power can be mistaken.
Lerouge and Warlop (2006) report that individuals are not particularly
accurate in their predictions about partner’s choices (a result echoed in
Bateman and Munro (2005) in the context of choices between lotteries).
Thus, a third issue making interpretation of power estimates difficult is
that altruistic individuals may take their partner’s well-being into account
when making choices, but may make predictive errors. If these errors are
systematic, then when they are corrected in jointly made choice this may be
confounded with estimates of power.
Income pooling is the property that the choices made by the household
do not depend on the identity of the person who receives the income. It is
an implication of the unitary model, while it is also compatible with some
7The issue of group polarization has a long history in social psychology with many
researchers finding that group decisions are more extreme than those made individually,
Isenberg (1986).
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versions of the non-cooperative model of the household. At a theoretical
level it is not generally compatible with cooperative models, since what dis-
tinguishes these models from the unitary model is that the weights placed
on the utilities of the partners may depend on the identity of who receives
the income. However, for the kinds of payoffs that are a feature of some
experiments, it would be a surprise if the weights were significantly altered
by income received during an experiment. As such therefore, provided pay-
offs are sufficiently low compared to income, we might expect behaviour
indistinguishable from income pooling even for cooperative families.
With a sample of 95 couples from Mannheim, Beblo and Beninger (2012)
conduct experiments to test income pooling. Specifically they examine
whether couples’ joint choice of department store vouchers depended on
how the winnings from the experiment were allocated to the individual part-
ners. They conclude that out of the 76 couples where individual preferences
differed, 36 pairs were income poolers in the sense of having consumption
choices that were independent of the intra-household distribution of income,
whereas the remaining subjects had joint choices which varied according to
the distribution, usually in a way that reflected individually-revealed pref-
erences.
With 22 couples from Jena in eastern Germany, De Palma et al. (2011)
conduct a series of tests of attitudes to risk. Individuals make choices over
investment in risky lotteries for the household and then couples make the
same decisions jointly. They find that couples’ choices are more likely to
reflect the risk attitudes of the male partner. De Palma et al. (2011) also find
evidence that the person holding the mouse in the computerized experiment
has more relatively more power in the joint tasks.
As with other types of experiments one issue with experiments within
the family is whether the effects observed have some external validity. Wiig
et al. (2012) conducts public good, risky choice and trade game experiments
individually and jointly at the homes of a sample of 255 couples from rural
Peru. After an initial explanation one spouse made decisions while the
other was out of the room. Then the other spouse made choices and finally,
in a twist that was not announced before-hand, the couples made joint
choices. The public good game is a 4 person linear VCM played with other,
anonymous non-household members. Details of the other games are not in
paper. The choices made in the individual and jointly played public good
games are compared and used to construct a measure of relative influence
in joint decision-making. The authors find that the inheritance of land (as a
proxy for domestic bargaining power) is associated with positive power in the
experimental decision. Meanwhile in Ethiopia Holden and Bezu (2013) run
dictator games within 380 couples. In the dictator game subjects are asked
how they would split 40 EB (Ethiopian Birr) (roughly US$2.5 or, according
to the authors, about two days wages for unskilled workers in locality) with a
spouse (or in some cases another family member) and 40 EB with a random
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participant from the same village. Recipients of the dictator’s generosity did
not know whether the money came from the spouse or another randomly
chosen participant. Equal sharing with the spouse was the most common
response by both men and women, while zero was the modal allocation to
the non-family member.
These experiment typically use money, but that is not always the case.
Miller and Mobarak (2011) conduct a field trial in rural Bangladesh in which
improved cooking stoves are offered (either free or subsidized) to one spouse
in each household selected at random. Subjects must decide between a
safer stove, a more efficient stove or no stove. Many households eventually
back out of a decision to buy the household so it is not clear whether the
experimental conditions represent ‘real’ or ‘hypothetical’ choices, but what
is notable is that the preferences of men and women differ particularly in
the case where there is a charge for the stove. Men are more likely to favour
more efficient stoves over healthier stoves and when intention to purchase
is compared to actual purchase it is the choices made initially by women
that are more likely to be reversed, especially when there is a charge for the
stove.
The willingness of one individual in a household to favour his or her own
consumption may depend not just on who receives income as in Beblo and
Beninger (2012) but also on how that income is received. Dasgupta and
Mani (2015) conduct an experiment with 105 couples from Bhogal a poor
section of Delhi, India. One randomly selected person in each couple makes
a choice between a private good (coupons for gender specific clothing) and a
joint consumption good (coupons for rice and lentils). In one treatment the
subjects must do a simple task to ‘earn’ the coupons which involves sorting
disks into bowls. They find that 22.7% of subjects choose the joint consump-
tion bundle in the no-effort treatment, while 9% pick the same bundle in the
effort treatment. In fact though the private good is the overwhelming choice
of both sexes, Dasgupta and Mani (2015) find a difference in the sensitivity
of the genders to treatment. When the reward is unearned the proportions
who choose the joint good is approximately the same (23.6% for women
and 21.8% for male participants). When endowments are earned the joint
consumption bundle is chosen less frequently by both sexes. However, while
14% of women choose the joint bundle, only 4% of the male participants
choose the same option. As a result the treatment effect is significant at the
99% level for men, but not for women (the p-value for Fisher’s exact test is
0.21).
An interesting take on love and power is offered in the experiment by
Goerges (2013) in the context of a group of 20 couples and 40 strangers
(with equal numbers of either sex) recruited at the University of Warwick
in the UK. Participants first make a joint decision on how to play: One
person can perform an unpaid task that triples the pay rate for the partner
or they can both do a paid task. After the tasks are completed subjects
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receive information about their payoffs privately then decide how much to
place in a common pool which is then distributed equally amongst the team.
In both treatments (games played within couples and games played between
strangers) both men and women sometimes take on the unpaid task. How-
ever its relative prevalence is higher amongst women when they play with
partners. With men the prevalence is the same with both partners and
strangers.
5. Risk.
The experimental literature on risk preferences is large and sophisticated.
Much of that literature has been devoted to investigating the adequacy of
the standard, expected utility theory (Starmer (2000)) for individuals. In
contrast, though households often have to make risky decisions we have little
experimental evidence on the subject. Though the detailed results vary be-
tween experiments, a typical finding is that subjects exhibit common-ratio
and common consequence effects, particularly when one of the lotteries in-
volves a large element of certainty about the payoff. In the typical common
ratio effect, subjects choose lottery A over B, but then choose D over C,
where C is a compound lottery, consisting of some chance p of receiving the
lottery A and some chance (1− p) of receiving another amount, x and D is
constructed from B in the same manner and with the same values of p and
x. Meanwhile in the common consequence effect there are three possible
outcomes and C (D) is constructed from A (B) by transferring some prob-
ability mass to the worst outcome from the middle outcome. Bateman and
Munro (2005) test expected utility theory for individuals and couples. In
that experiment subjects make choices first separately and then jointly over
a sequence of 12 lotteries in which payoffs are defined for each partner. The
main focus is on whether couple deviate from expected utility and indeed
they find evidence of both common ratio effect and common consequence
effect in the choices made by individuals and couples. They also find that
couples often play the same lottery in a more risk averse manner compared
to both the individual partners. As a result, in many cases the choices made
collectively contradict the individual choices, meaning that Pareto efficiency
is rejected. By manipulating who receives the payoff, while keeping the
household level payoff constant, the experiment provides a series of tests of
income pooling. Income pooling is rejected for the individuals in the exper-
iment, but not for the jointly made choices. 8 In the original experiment,
subject choices and payoffs are hidden from their partners, but in a follow-up
experiment using similar protocols (Munro et al. (2008a)) their main results
8A finding echoed in research on group attitudes to lotteries reported in Masclet et al.
(2009) or Viscusi et al. (2011) .
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are unchanged, suggesting that it is not information that is behind the the
source of subject’s behaviour, a point I return to in the next section of the
paper. They speculate that avoidance of blame or reject may be a factor.
Table 3: Risk.
Study Location, sample
size
Method Notable Results
Bateman and
Munro (2005)
Norwich, UK, 40 individual and collective
choices over lotteries with
individual payoffs
joint choices more risk averse than
individual; preference reversals
Munro et al.
(2008a)
London, UK, 40 individual and collective
choices over lotteries with
individual payoffs
joint choices more risk averse than
individual; behaviour unaffected by
transparency of decisions
De Palma
et al. (2011)
Jena, Germany,
22
risky decisions with
couple-level payoffs
women more risk averse than male
partners
Abdellaoui
et al. (2012)
Paris, France, 64 risky decisions with
couple-level payoffs
risk attitudes are not highly
correlated; mean weight on women’s
preferences is 0.4
He et al.
(2012)
China, 100 student couples; risky choice
elicited using Holt-Laury
joint choices are less risk averse than
individuals
Carlsson et al.
(2013)
China, Guizhou
province, 117
couples
individual and joint risky
decisions
Choices more similar in richer
households. Generally joint decision
look like husband’s individual
preferences.
Braaten and
Martinsson
(2015)
Andean Peru,
287
Holt-Laury with both
individual and joint choice
joint choices reflect the more risk
averse partner
Meanwhile, in a more recent experiment conducted with 64 couples from
Paris, Abdellaoui et al. (2012) use 6 high stakes tasks to elicit attitudes
for risk for both individuals and the couple. Unlike Bateman and Munro
(2005) but in common with De Palma et al. (2011) payoffs are shown for the
couple as a whole and not for individuals. Individual preferences are elicited
first then those for couples. The authors find little evidence of correlation
between individual risk attitudes but generally men in their sample are less
risk averse than their spouses. They find evidence for an inverse ‘S’ shaped
probability weighting function similar to that typically found for individuals.
Meanwhile the mean weight placed upon women’s choices in jointly made
choices is estimated to be approximately 0.4, which given the standard errors
in the experiment, is not significantly different from 0.5.
Much of the pioneering work in this area is associated with a research
group from the University of Gothenburg. Using 100 student couples from
China and choices between lotteries in a Holt-Laury mechanism, He et al.
(2012) find that the group is generally less risk averse than the individuals
within it. Their results are in line with some previous results from ad-hoc
group experiments (though in contrast to Bateman and Munro (2005)) and
they interpret the outcome as providing some validation of the usefulness of
ad-hoc groups in experiments. Also in China, the team in Carlsson et al.
(2013) go from house to house conducting risky choice experiments with
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spouses find that the choices made by spouses in richer households are more
likely to be similar than those made in poorer households. This might reflect
greater risk sharing or be due to assortative mating. In an experiment with
a similar methodology from Andean Peru, Braaten and Martinsson (2015)
find evidence that it is the more risk averse spouse who is apparently more
influential in joint decisions. As with Munro et al. (2008a) they suggest that
a desire to avoid blame or regret may behind the pattern of joint choices.
In the section on bargaining I have argued that scale may be confounded
with measures of power. For risky choices, another theoretical consideration
is risk-sharing - a point already emphasized in the discussion of Robinson
(2012). If subjects pool all their risk, then revealed risk attitudes (i.e. the
pattern of choices in lotteries) should be the same for both spouses and
for joint choice. The experiments listed in Table 3 suggest that there is
imperfect risk sharing in households but they also suggest that in some
cases, the preferences of the unit may not be a convex combination of the
individual choices.
6. Information and Hiding.
Most of the basic models of the household surveyed for example in Ver-
meulen (2002) and Apps and Rees (2009) take it as a simplifying assumption
that there is no asymmetric information within the household. In support
of this Browning et al. (2011) argue, ‘Asymmetric information, however, is
probably less problematic in households than in other types of relationship
(say, between employers and employees or insurers and insurees), because
the very nature of the relationship often implies deep mutual knowledge
and improved monitoring ability.’ On the other hand, it seems to be widely
accepted that in many different kinds of societies husbands and wives rou-
tinely hide consumption and income from their spouses (Munro (2014)). In
other words, there is both ignorance of what the other partners is doing,
but also active attempts to misrepresent the scale of income and consump-
tion in some households. A feature of the available evidence is that spouses
often hide resources, but hidden assets and consumption are concentrated
in a few goods. Dagnelie and LeMay (2008) report on a survey of 572 hus-
bands and wives in Benin on the outskirts of the city of Cotonou. They
find that 79% do not know their spouse’s income and 76% believe that their
partner does not know their income. They argue that secrecy and a norm
of not enquiring too deeply about a partner’s income helps spouses hide
their income and retain control over how it is spent. The results are similar
to those from Clark (1994) study of trading women in west African cities,
where shared budgets between husbands and wives were rare. She states
that amongst the Asante of Kumasi in Ghana, “virtual ignorance of the
husband’s amount and sources of income is not uncommon and some of the
women openly recommended it. As long as he contributed adequately to
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the children’s expense, it was better not to know about the rest. Besides,
he was more likely to pay his share if he did not know the full extent of your
own income.” P. 340. She notes that some women state that it was better
to live with their husbands in order to monitor their income.
Recent experimental data strongly supports the notion of intra-household
hiding though possibly not in Western countries. In follow-up interviews
with 51 couples that participated in their Ugandan experiments, Iversen
et al. (2006) find imperfect knowledge of spousal finances to be common,
at least in wives’ accounts. Some 72 percent of men claim full knowledge
of wives’ finances, and 92 percent that their wives fully know theirs. In
wives’ accounts these figures are startlingly different: 21 and 14 percent,
respectively. In related studies for India, Nigeria and Ethiopia respectively,
Kebede et al. (2014), Munro et al. (2014) find similar tales of hiding and
ignorance.
Ashraf (2009)’s experimental investigation of saving and consumption
decisions in the Philippines is motivated by the practices of local households.
Working in combination with a local bank, individual spouses receive an
endowment from the experimenter that must be invested in a joint account,
in a private account or taken as a private gift certificate. In one treatment
choices are entirely private; in a second treatment partners can observe
each other’s choices, but not intervene, while in the third treatment, the
spouses make choices together after having an opportunity to discuss and
negotiate the options. Ashraf finds men’s saving behaviour to be strategic,
but complex: they are more willing to place money in a private account or
spend it on personal consumption if the decision is not discussed with the
spouse. Switching from the private to observable treatment, male choice
of the gift token rises sharply, while placing the sum in a private account
falls. In the negotiated outcome, the money is more likely to be deposited
in a joint account. Women’s behaviour shows the same qualitative patterns,
but in contrast to men, the differences between treatments when viewed
separately, are statistically insignificant. In further analysis she shows that
the difference in responses to treatment is linked to the control individuals
have over household savings in real life. Where women have control their
response to treatment is similar to that for men who have control.
Further experimental evidence on hiding is provided by Jakiela and Ozier
(2011). In this Kenyan based study, 2145 individuals from 26 rural villages
play an investment game. Though endowments (which can be high or low)
are private knowledge in some treatments, winnings are made public. Fur-
ther, subjects in one treatment had opportunities to hide (at a cost) exper-
imental winnings. At a low price for hiding nearly 50% of women chose to
hide their winnings, while in the treatment where hiding was not feasible,
investment was lower than in treatments where choices and winnings were
hidden. From the perspective of household experiments, the key result is
that women who had relatives present (not necessarily spouses) in the ex-
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periment were willing to pay more to hide their winnings. Men’s willingness
to pay to hide, on the other hand generally does not seem to be sensitive the
presence of kin. Mani (2011) reports on a similar kind of game conducted
in the Anantpur district of Andhra Pradesh, India in October 2005, but one
focused entirely on family members. The sample consisted of 300 house-
holds, recruited by means of an NGO, well-established in the area. In this
case, male and female subjects face four investment decisions to be made
separately, one of which is implemented using a random lottery device. In
all cases, subjects chose between two options for investment with a certain
payoff. One investment dominated the other, paying off 100% compared
to 50%. An important feature of the design is that the household income
maximizing strategy is always straightforward: place everything in the dom-
inating investment. Mani (2011) finds instead that men and women place
around only 80% of their funds in the high return investment. Moreover
the amount decreases as the control rights of the spouse increase. Informa-
tion treatment has some effect but it is not generally statistically significant.
Even in the case where shares are fixed, many individuals do not place all
the funds in the high return investment. Mani interprets this as ‘spite’,
meaning that subjects are deliberately and at personal cost refusing to earn
money that will be shared with their partners but this might represent some
misunderstanding on the part of participants. Mani (2011) though notes
that investing all is more common when men’s pre-assigned share is greater
than 0.5.
Another experiment based on 250 couples from the Siaya district of east-
ern Kenya, finds that on average both men and women give less to their part-
ners in a dictator game, when the transfer is anonymous, compared to the
situation where the source of transfers were identifiable. Adult subjects were
recruited through local administrators and played three modified dictator
games (with one picked at random for implementation): secret and public
games with their spouse and a standard dictator game played with someone
else taking part in the experiment. The design enables the researcher to hide
from the spouse the exact source of any receipts he or she might receive, al-
though of course she or he will be know that there is some chance that their
spouse was the source. To test for efficiency, a token passed to a partner is
worth 50% more than a token kept for the self. To mask the decision more
thoroughly and also to generate more data, each spouse makes six dictator
decisions towards their wife or husband with differing total endowments.
Hoel (2015) finds that when considering mean behaviour, men give a 9.2
percentage points more in public game than in private, while wives give 6.9
percentage points more under the same circumstances. However, the modal
effect is zero: women give the same amount in 50% of games and men given
identical proportions in 49% of cases. A possibly surprising feature of the
data is that around 14% of subjects consistently give more to their partners
in the secret treatment. Efficiency is rare. The option of passing the entire
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endowment to the spouse is chosen in less than 3% of cases and on average
participants give up 16% of total household earnings, by reserving some of
the payoff for themselves. Interestingly, Hoel (2015) reports that individu-
als who state that their partners know their expenditures are more likely to
behave strategically in the experiment. She argues that this transparency in
the household may be the equilibrium response to opportunistic behaviour.
In other words, when partners trust and are trustworthy transparency is
unnecessary.
While most of these experiments use money, Ashraf et al. (2014) consider
how the presence of husbands in a briefing about family planning affects sub-
sequent uptake of a free voucher for contraceptives. When both spouses had
to sign for the voucher contraceptive use was lower compared to the situa-
tion where only the wife was present and required to sign. In rural Ghana,
Castilla and Walker (2013) use goods as well as money. They report that, in
southern Ghana where the experiment is held, the implicit rules of marriage
mean that husbands must provide cash in the form of ‘chop money’ to their
spouses to cover the daily costs of the household. The wives choose how
this money is spent and whether to divert some of the money into private
goods. Moreover the chop money the wives receive is normally decreasing
in the amount the wife earns, giving them an incentive to hide earnings. In
the experiment, four rounds of games followed by individual surveys about
chop money, household expenditure and consumption were conducted over
several months in 2009. In each round, individuals subjects took part in a
lottery with prizes paid out either in the form of cash or in-kind (chickens or
female goats). In one treatment, the cash lotteries were private and in the
other treatment cash prizes were publicly observed. In their analysis, the
authors assume that animal prizes were observable but here there were two
treatments too: one with higher visibility and publicly announced prizes and
one where the actual lottery was conducted in private. The analysis suggests
that women’s receipt of a large prize lowers chop money subsequently, with
some evidence of lagged effects. Meanwhile for men, whether a lottery is
public or private has little impact on chop money behaviour. However, for
both sexes the public/private nature of the prize does seem to be reflected in
subsequent expenditure, with spending on publicly observable forms of con-
sumption (e.g. ceremonies) more likely when the lottery win was public. In
this kind of behaviour therefore men and women are taking the opportunity
afforded by private winnings to mask consumption from both their spouses
and other members of the surrounding community. Some of the impacts of
earnings may only be observed with a lag (of a few months) leading Castilla
and Walker (2013) to conclude that, “especially among wives, loans and
delayed spending of prize money suggest that the information asymmetry
may have a greater effect on inter-temporal allocations than on inter-good
allocations, possibly in a way which counteracts the power balance within
the household and increases women’s capacity to save and self-insure.”
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Table 4: Information.
Study Location, sample
size
Method Notable Results
Ashraf (2009) Mindanao,
Philippines, 146
Subjects choose between joint
account, private account or private
gift certificate. Treatments vary in
the degree of spousal interaction.
Men and women follow the same
pattern (for men the pairwise
comparisons are significant): less
willing to place money in a joint
account if the decision is not
negotiated.
Mani (2011) Andhra Pradesh,
India, 300
households
Subjects choose between high and
low return investment. In some
treatments low return investment is
kept by subject and secret while
high return is shared.
Subjects rarely invest all in the
high return investment (the
efficient strategy). Investment falls
as control rights fall, but
information has little effect.
Jakiela and
Ozier (2011)
Western Kenya,
2145 individuals
Subjects receive high or low
endowments; public or privately
make investment in risky good. In
some treatments privacy could be
purchased.
Women especially willing to pay to
hide endowment and winnings,
particularly when relatives were in
the same session.
Munro et al.
(2014)
Uttar Pradesh
and Tamil Nadu,
India, 1200
Intra-couple VCM with and without
full information.
Men invest less when there is full
information; women in the south
invest less.
Castilla and
Walker
(2013)
Southern Ghana,
600 individuals
Private and public lotteries for cash
and chickens; follow up household
surveys.
Publicly observable spending
higher when lottery win is public;
men cut back transfer to women
after women win a lottery.
Kebede et al.
(2014)
Ethiopia, 1200 VCM with and without full
information.
Information has no systematic
effect on contribution rates.
Munro et al.
(2013)
Uttar Pradesh,
India, 344
individuals
Field experiment - digging in 4
person mixed sex teams.
Teams are more productive in
treatment where couples work
together.
Ashraf et al.
(2014)
Zambia, 749
married women
Half the sample receive free
contraceptive voucher in presence of
husband that requires his signature;
half receive voucher alone.
Contraceptive use (particularly
injectable) higher when women
alone receive the voucher
Hoel (2015) Eastern Kenya,
250
Modified dictator game (50%
premium for giving) with variation
in identifiability of donor
Men donate more to partners
when the source is identifiable.
Full donation (i.e. efficient level) is
rare for both sexes.
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An important question concerns how information affects productivity in
the household. Here we have little evidence to date, but Munro et al. (2013)
in Uttar Pradesh, India compare the productivity of several hundred mixed
sex teams of four in a digging task performed under NREGA - a workfare
programme designed to assist the rural poor in India. In one treatment
spouses are in the same four person team while in the control spouses work
for separate teams. In each case teams dig real water storage tanks for
three hours with men doing the digging while women transport the soil to
a nearby location. Productivity is nearly 50% higher when spouses work
in the same team. This result may be due to the improved monitoring of
work effort that can occur when spouses are in the same team. However,
it is also compatible with a free-riding interpretation: when spouses work
together they represent 50% of the total team, whereas when they work
separately each makes up only one quarter of a team. Thus, even with full
monitoring of a partner’s effort and a unitary household, we would expect
lower productivity when partners are separated.
7. Time.
How do the expressed intertemporal preferences of households or cou-
ples compare to the preferences made by individuals? From a theoretical
perspective, Hertzberg (2011) or Zuber (2011) or Jackson and Yariv (2010)
argue that in general, aggregating choices across individuals with different
inter-temporal discount rates can lead to time inconsistent preferences at the
level of the group. The issue can be illustrated using a slight extension of
the earlier model. Suppose that subscripts t = 1, .., 3 refer to time periods.
Individual i has preferences summarized by the following utility function,
where ρi is the discount factor for person i.
U i =
t=3∑
t=0
(
ρi
)t
u(xt) (7)
Meanwhile the household chooses according to,
W =
t=3∑
t=0
(
λ
(
ρi
)t
u(xt) + (1− λ)
(
ρj
)t
v(xt)
)
(8)
In this situation, preferences are time consistent if the preference between
two consumption plans is independent of time period. Preferences of the
form expressed in 7 are time consistent: an individual who prefers plan x to
plan x’ at time 0 will also have the same preferences at t > 0. However, this
is not necessarily true of the household preferences summarized in 8. For
instance suppose u = v = x and consider preferences between consuming 1
unit in period 1 and 1+r units in period 2. Let ρ1 = 1 and ρ2 = 0.5. In this
case, at time zero, consuming in period 1 is preferred as long as,
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λ+ (1− λ)0.5 ≥ (λ+ (1− λ)0.25) (1 + r)
Or
r ≤ 1− λ
1 + 3λ
However in period 1, the household prefers to consume in period 1 pro-
vided,
1 ≥ (λ+ (1− λ)0.5) (1 + r)
Or,
r ≤ 1− λ
1 + λ
In other words, there are values of r where the household prefers con-
sumption in period 2 at time 0, but prefers immediate consumption when
period 1 is reached. The reason is that as long as individual discount rates
differ and some weight is placed on the utility functions of both individuals
then the weighted discount factor is not geometric and hence preferences
can be time inconsistent.
As with static choice, making inferences about λor other indices of rel-
ative power can be problematic with dynamic choice experiments. Let us
confine attention to two periods and suppose that preferences for an indi-
vidual are:
U i = λi
(
u(x1) + ρ
iu(x2)
)
+
(
1− λi) (v(x1) + ρˆjv(x2))
In this expression, λi represents the weight placed by person i on their
partner’s well-being when making choices while ρˆj is their belief about the
other person’s discount factor. Meanwhile joint preferences are summarized
by the household utility function,
W = λ
(
u(x1) + ρ
iu(x2)
)
+ (1− λ) (v(x1) + ρjv(x2))
The difference between these two expressions is composed of two parts:(
λ− λi) and (ρˆj − ρj) - the difference between the weight placed on the
partner’s preferences by the individual and household and the difference
between the beliefs of the individual about the partner’s discount factor
and the reality. Even if the individual correctly predicts the intertemporal
preferences of the partner, it may not possible to separate altruism from
power in the determinants of household choice.
Some careful experimental evidence can be found in Carlsson and Yang
(2013) who faced a group of 164 rural Chinese couples with inter-temporal
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decisions of the kind typically found in experiments on individual discount-
ing. In their own homes, the participants faced individual and joint choices
between time-dated payments using a convex budget method for eliciting
preferences. The order of individual versus collective decisions was random-
ized across couples and subjects were informed that in the joint treatment
each spouse would receive half the payoff. Prior to making the actual de-
cisions each subject went through two practice trials. Yang and Carlsson
(2012) reports on the same data showing that 11% of couples in the sample
are more impatient than the component individuals while 81% had discount
rates lying between those for the individual spouses and 9% of couples were
more patient than either individual. Couples were less prone to make time
inconsistent choices, but overall the authors conclude “a majority of the
observed shifts are impatient and time-inconsistent shifts”.
Meanwhile, Abdellaoui et al. (2013) take 64 couples recruited from public
adverts in Paris, and at the participant’s homes conduct discounting exper-
iments alongside the risk experiments discussed earlier (Abdellaoui et al.
(2012)). As with the risk questions, individual values were obtained be-
fore couples were interviewed together. Values were elicited through a three
stage bracketing procedure: subjects were first given a choice between a fixed
amount at time t, and a series of 11 amounts to be received one week after
the experiment. This defined an upper and lower point of indifference which
was used to refine the switching point in the second and third stages of the
computer-based procedure. Potential payments were up to 1200 Euros. On
the whole couples were more patient than their constituent individuals, with
only 52% of couples having discount rates that lay between the individual
values. The authors conduct a regression model to relate household dis-
count rates to individual rates and conclude that the weight placed on each
spouse’s discount rate is not significantly different from 0.5. The higher pa-
tience of the collective is consistent with that found by Shapiro (2010) in his
laboratory investigation of US students, asked to make inter-temporal pref-
erences separately and as members of a group. Though the questions were
unfortunately purely hypothetical, the results collected by Ziegler and Tun-
ney (2012) are interesting. They question people about their intertemporal
choices on behalf of others and find that as social distance (e.g. kinship)
rises, individuals become more patient in their choices.
With a sample of 598 couples from a Western region of Kenya, near to
the town of Busia which is close to the Ugandan border, Schaner (2012)
investigates savings strategies when preferences differ between spouses, by
inviting each couple to open three savings accounts (one joint and two indi-
vidual) which offered potentially different interest rates. The costs of open-
ing the accounts was covered by the experimenter while at the same time,
subjects faced individual tests of inter-temporal discount rates for a period
of 6 months following the experimental intervention. Overall, approximately
43% of couples open at least one account. Of these when the joint account
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Table 5: Time.
Study Location, sample
size
Method Notable Results
Carlsson et al.
(2012)
China, Guizhou
province 117
18 pairwise individual
and joint choices over
timing
Most elicited joint discount rates are
in between individual rates; in
nearly all joint decisions husbands
have more weight.
Schaner (2012) Busia, Kenya,
598
Savings accounts with
varying access rules and
interest rates
couples with similar discount rates
make generally efficient choices
Ziegler and
Tunney (2012)
61 female and 9
male UK
students
450 hypothetical choices higher discount rates when choosing
on behalf of closer relatives.
Abdellaoui et al.
(2013)
Paris, France, 64 In-home interviews couples generally more patient than
their individuals
Carlsson and
Yang (2013)
China, 164
couples
Convex time budgets 9% of couples more impatient than
either individual; 11% more patient
offers the highest interest rate, 7/180 ’well-matched’ fail to save efficiently,
while 23/183 of mismatched couples save in a way that does not maximize
total household returns. More generally, the results indicate that partners
with close discount rates were more likely to place savings in the account
with the highest interest rate, whereas couples with mismatched discount
rates were relatively insensitive to interest rates and tended to favour savings
by means of individual accounts.
8. Framing and Judgement and Behavioural Economics.
Households and the individuals within them may make choices that de-
part from the standard model of consistent, complete and context-free pref-
erences. With individual choice, the standard model is usually interpreted in
terms of rationality. Hence deviations from the standard model imply a form
of irrationality and are often labelled as “anomalies”. As Arrow’s impossi-
bility theorem demonstrated, with collective decisions, choices involve some
form of aggregation and thus a failure to be consistent or transitive may be
due to the method by which preferences are aggregated rather than the ir-
rationality of the underlying partners. In its original form Arrow’s theorem
requires at least three participating individuals, but as the example of the
previous section showed even with a two person household, straightforward
methods of aggregation can produce inconsistent household choices even
when individual preferences are consistent and complete. Making inferences
about rationality on the basis of household choices is therefore always going
to be problematic, but nevertheless there is an obvious interest in know-
ing whether collective choices show some of the same patterns as individual
choice. One particular reason concerns external validity: if choices made at
the household level do not show the same features as individual choice ex-
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periments, then the relevance of the anomalies literature for understanding
market behaviour might be limited.
Tests in this area are unusual, but Munro and Popov (2012) conduct
a series of experiments on U.K. couples at a variety of venues, including a
school Christmas fair and a university open day. They test for a variety
of framing effects including the endowment effect (e.g. Knetsch (1989)),
asymmetric dominance, compromise effects. A compromise effect occurs in
the context of comparisons between choices made from two sets of goods,
{A,B} and {A,B,C} Simonson (1989). Like the endowment effect, it is
commonly found in individual choice experiments with or without incentives.
In the choice set, B is chosen to be a convex combination of A and C. A
strong compromise effect is said to occur if the probability B is chosen is
higher when C is present in the choice set. The strong effect is a rejection
of the notion of complete preferences since it implies that for some decision-
makers, the ranking of A versus B depends on the presence or absence of
option C. A weak compromise effect occurs if the probability that A is chosen
falls when C is in the choice set. Such a result is incompatible with consistent
preferences if those preferences are convex, because by convexity someone
who prefers A to B will also prefer A to C. Parallel experiments are run with
non-student individuals and with students. Couples show endowment effects
to the same extent as individuals. Behaviour in tasks involving a compromise
effect is also similar across the sub-samples, which both individuals and
couples favouring a compromise good over extremes. The results of Bateman
and Munro (2005) on risky choice are compatible with households having
non-expected utility preferences, a view supported and extended by the
results in Abdellaoui et al. (2012) based on work with French couples.
Some recent group experiments have investigated whether “two heads
are better than one” in questions of logic, probability and game theoretic
reasoning. Kocher and Sutter (2005) considers beauty contests where pairs
outperform individuals, Charness et al. (2007) finds groups less likely to
choice first order stochastically dominated options and Cooper and Kagel
(2005) find dyads’ choices conform more closely to the predictions of stan-
dard game theory than individuals in signalling games and for a general
review see Kugler et al. (2012). This kind of comparative information is not
yet available for couples either in the experimental economics literature or
in the wider field of social psychology research. Still, Yang and Carlsson
(2012) for instance in the experiments with Chinese spouses discussed in
the previous section, do find that present bias is present for jointly made
intertemporal choices as well as for individual choices - suggesting that a
taste for immediate gratification is not tempered by joint responsibility for
decisions.
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9. Non-spousal experiments.
Most of the experiments discussed so far involve spouses as participants,
although some such as Jakiela and Ozier (2011) had a mixture of friends,
relatives and strangers. In theory and in practice other members of the
household can affect decisions either indirectly (e.g. one parent seeking
resources to pass on to the children) or directly. Even more so than ex-
periments with couples, the settings, designs and samples are even more
disparate for this category. In the original economics experiment, Peters
et al. (2004), mixes families in the public goods games. In Brazil, Reynolds
(2013) conducts a trust experiment played between 153 teenage mothers
and their mothers in Salvador, North-Eastern Brazil and finds in favour of a
cooperative (joint payoff maximizing) model. Also in Brazil, Bursztyn and
Coffman (2012) consider the effect of cash versus conditional payments to
parents on schooling decisions. Meanwhile in Istanbul, Bran˜as Garza et al.
(2013) use social choice experiments to examine the correlation between the
preferences of parents and those of their children. Ambler (2012)’s sample
of 1,300 migrant householders in the USA and their relatives covers a range
of intra-household relationships. In the experiment migrant workers must
decide what portion of a $600 cash windfall to remit back to El Salvador to a
high school or college age relative selected by the participant. Choices were
restricted to units of $100 and across the whole sample, two actual windfalls
were available, paid out through a subsequent lottery. Recipient subjects
are randomly assigned to one of four groups defined by two treatments that
manipulate the information available to the pairs. On average, migrants sent
approximately US$20 more when they believed that the recipient would be
informed of the identity of the sender (US $ 465 rather than US $ 441) and
more migrants transferred the whole amount. Within the recipient group
the response to treatment was quite small perhaps reflecting the limited op-
portunities for verification, but there is some evidence that recipients would
spend more on educational expenses and less on daily expenses when the
information about their choices was not revealed to donors. The clearest
effect is that stated intentions for expenditure were more closely aligned to
donor’s preferences when that information was revealed to potential recip-
ients. On trust, Vollan (2011) compares the results of a trust game from
experiments conducted with 215 friends and relations in South Namibia
and South Africa. In the absence of third party punishment individuals
trust family and friends more than other village members, but there is no
significant difference between the attitudes expressed towards family and
friends. When third party punishment is possible, the pattern of results is
similar, but the presence of TPP seems to raise trust towards friends and
strangers but lower it towards family members.
In a recent experiment, Sinan U¨nu¨r et al. (2013) compare transfers made
by a group of 45 US parents to their teenage children in a moral hazard
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context where the children make risky choices. They find that when children
(12-18 year olds) are passive recipients of random endowments, parents tend
to equalize final resources amongst their two children. When children can
undertake risky actions, by opting to place their endowment in an unfair
bet, parents are less likely to equalize final payoffs and more likely to make
an equal transfer. Children are more likely to choose the risky bet if it can
be hidden from their parents. Meanwhile, Munro and Tanaka (2014) take a
group of 500 adolescent children in rural Uganda and compare their risk and
discounting attitudes to those of a randomly chosen parent (only the risk
preferences are incentivized). As with Sinan U¨nu¨r et al. (2013) children are
less risk averse than their parents. They also report that children have higher
loss aversion wherease for discounting, the parents are more impatient.
A modified dictator game is used by U¨nu¨r et al. (2007) at a twins fair in
the USA where they recruit 113 people placed into 22 groups. The groups
are quite heterogeneous, with identical twins in some groups and not others,
parents in some groups and not others and so on. In the experimental
sessions, subjects can pass money to other members of the group as they
wish, by allocating from a budget of 100 tokens. The authors conclude that,
in broad terms the results are consistent with less giving to individuals with
greater social distance, but it is not the case that all the tokens are typically
passed to family members. In fact, a significant minority of subjects simply
split the budget equally while siblings receive relatively less than might be
predicted on the basis of Hamilton’s rule.
10. Conclusions and next steps.
Incentivized intra-household experiments have now taken place in over
20 different countries including Bangladesh (1), Benin (1), Brazil (2), P.R.
China (3), Colombia (1), Ethiopia (2), France (5), Germany (2), Ghana
(1), India (5), Japan (1), Kenya (3), Nigeria (1), Malawi (1), Mongolia (1),
Peru (2), Turkey (1), Uganda (2), UK (4), USA (3) and Zambia (1)). The
diversity of environments, coupled with sample sizes and differences in de-
signs make it all-but impossible to draw general lessons about the results.
Bluntly though, evidence of joint payoff maximization between spouses is
rather thin on the ground. With some experimental subjects playing unfa-
miliar one shot games there is evidence of misunderstanding after practices
have been completed but before the actual game is played. Nevertheless,
there are a number of experiments with full information and clear evidence
of subject understanding where the majority of spouses do not make choices
that maximize total household income. Possibly the simplest explanation of
the general pattern of failure is that physical control of an endowment gives
a spouse greater bargaining power over how that resource is to be used. To
surrender the endowment to the partner or to a common pool is to give up
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some bargaining rights and for an individual the loss might outweigh the
gain from having a larger total income for the household.
From a policy perspective the widespread failure to attain efficiency has
mixed implications. On the one hand, inefficiency in an important economic
institution represents a potential loss to society. Against this, the evidence of
many of these experiments suggests that money or resources received by one
partner sticks to that partner (at least in part). A worry with many policies
aimed at changing the balance of power between the sexes is precisely the
opposite: that resources directed towards female spouses will be taxed or
claimed by their male partners. Income pooling is the enemy of economic
policies aimed at particular individuals within the household.
Another prominent theme that emerges is the demand for secrecy by
individual partners, a result that chimes with much of the anthropological
literature though not particularly with standard economic models of the
household. In part this desire to hide winnings from partners is one source
of inefficiency, but as the results of VCM games show it is not the whole issue.
And a third theme is that often the joint choices, whether about risk, timing
or immediate consumption are often not some weighted average of partner’s
separate decisions. As is well-known for groups, couples and households do
not necessarily behave like their constituent parts. It is possible that part of
the reason why joint choice is not always a convex combination of individual
choices may be due to some randomness in household utility, which suggests
a need for some theoretical developments in this area.
With household experiments, there remains much in the way of unex-
plored terrain, some of it methodological, some of it policy orientated. For
instance, there are no same-sex couples in the samples reported in this sur-
vey. Burns et al. (2008) is one of a number of papers that have reported some
differences in the typical management of financial affairs between same-sex
and heterosexual couples. It would be useful to know if these differences
extend to behaviour in the kinds of experiments presented above.
Another feature of most experiments to date is the exogenous manner
in which decisions have to be made. In a typical experiment a couple is
forced to make decisions together, to share information or they are asked to
make decisions separately. In reality, some spouses may delegate particular
decisions while others aim to make all but the non-trivial decisions col-
lectively. The heterogeneous nature of household decision-making arrange-
ments means that forcing a household to adopt a particular way of making
its decision may not be externally valid meaning that experiments where
households can choose how they solve decision problems may be more pre-
dictive of world choice. At the same time, it would be interesting to know
if they were experimentally manipulable factors that influence whether a
decision is taken by one spouse or the other or made jointly. And while
a handfull of experiments (e.g. discussed here used production, it has not
so far been common. Nevertheless, understanding issues such as household
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division of labour (e.g. as inCouprie et al. (2015)), may require it.
As reported above the existence of decision-making anomalies within
households has not received much attention and as I have emphasized, the
key aspects of household as groups is that they are ongoing and that some of
the ties within the household are based on emotions of love, altruism and so
on. Given this, what sort of household-specific anomalies could we expect?
My expectation is that in many households the adult protagonists in any
decision will have one eye on the long-run implications for the health of the
relationship. As a result, there may be a high emphasis on equality and
mutual concessions in bargaining decisions (as in Corfman and Lehmann
(1987)) plus an aversion to individual losses within the household. Mean-
while many of the group experiments referred to in the introduction find that
group are better at solving puzzle-based decisions compared to inviduals. I
wonder whether this is an area where household-based groups will do less
well than other types of groups because of ‘interference’ from emotions and
considerations about group harmony and so on. The desire for harmony and
consensus may also produce intertemporal anomalies when delaying choice
is a possible way to resolve conflict.
Much of the recent literature on public goods has emphasized the means
such as punishment and communication through which cooperation can be
supported. In some cases, punishment and reward is monetary while in
other well-known experiments, communication is symbolic for instance by
the use of happy and sad faces. Symbolic communication can be surprising
effective amongst on-going groups (e.g. amongst fisherman as reported in
Carpenter and Seki (2011)), but it is an open question how cooperation is
most effectively sustained within households.
In some societies, the two-generation nuclear family represents the most
common living arrangement for working age adults. There are though, many
societies where three generations live together or extended families live close
by and share some or all responsibility for family decisions. Some of the
motives for hiding money and keeping money from the common pool in the
experiments surveyed above, might not be to keep money away from spouse;
it might be aimed at stop in-laws, siblings and children making a claim on the
winnings. Just as studying individual choice may tell us little about how
couples make decisions, studying couples may be relatively uninformative
when other members of the household have influence.
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